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Abstract: 
 
We explore the relationship between risk preference and educational attainment for a sample of adults drawn 
from the 1996 U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Using a sequence of questions from the 1996 
PSID, we construct measures of an individual’s risk aversion and risk tolerance allowing us to explore the 
implications of interpersonal differences in risk preference for educational attainment. Our empirical findings 
suggest that an individual’s degree of risk aversion (tolerance) is inversely (positively) associated with their 
educational attainment. In addition, using the 1997 and 2002 Child Development Supplements of the PSID, we 
explore the relationship between the risk preference of parents and the academic achievements of their children. 
Our findings suggest that a parent’s degree of risk aversion (tolerance) is negatively (positively) related to the 
academic achievements of their children.  
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I. Introduction and Background 
Given the uncertainty surrounding returns to investments in human capital, it is not surprising 
that the risk preference of individuals has played a key role in the theory of human capital 
accumulation.1 By definition, any investment in human capital can be considered risky, since 
the return is unknown and uncertain. For example, Palacios-Huerta (2003) finds that, due to 
the degree of risk associated with human capital investments, the actual gains from higher 
education per unit of risk in the U.S. are in the region of 5 to 20 per cent higher than that from 
risky financial assets.2 Furthermore, it is not clear how one can reduce the degree of risk 
associated with human capital investments. As pointed out by Shaw (1996), the standard 
approach to reducing risk in financial investment, namely diversification, is often not 
available in the context of human capital investment. Typically, an individual holds one job 
with his/her human capital investments tailored accordingly. Hence, given the risk associated 
with returns to human capital investments, as well as difficulties with the diversification of 
such investments, the risk preference of individuals plays an important role in the decision to 
acquire human capital. 
Given the obvious problems in measuring individuals’ risk preferences, it is not 
surprising that attitudes towards risk have attracted limited attention in the empirical 
literature. In some empirical models of human capital accumulation, a parameter of constant 
risk aversion has been included,3 but such an approach does not allow variation in risk 
preferences across individuals to play a role in the investment decision-making process. Belzil 
and Hansen (2004), for example, estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling 
decisions where the degree of risk aversion is inferred from school decisions. In this model, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Johnson (1978), Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992).  
2 Harmon et al. (2003a) have adjusted the returns to schooling for individual risk by estimating Mincerian wage 
equations allowing for random coefficients, which yields dispersion (i.e. risk) in the returns to schooling by 
assigning individual specific returns. 
3 Such studies include Brown and Rosen (1987), Moore (1987) and Murphy and Topel (1987). 
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individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to ability yet homogenous with 
respect to the degree of risk aversion.  
An important exception in the literature is Shaw (1996) who jointly models investment 
in risky human capital and financial wealth allowing for interpersonal differences in risk 
preference. Shaw (1996) presents a theoretical framework which predicts an inverse 
relationship between an individual’s degree of risk aversion and investment in risky human 
capital. The model is based on a portfolio allocation framework extended to incorporate an 
individual’s decision to invest in risky human capital. Since human capital accumulation is 
modeled as a standard investment process, the less risk averse individuals are predicted to 
invest in relatively high levels of education. The empirical analysis suggests that risk 
preference affects the returns to human capital, although the relationship between risk 
preference and educational attainment is not directly explored. Brown and Taylor (2005) find 
supporting evidence using British panel data. In a similar vein, Brunello (2002) presents a 
theoretical framework which predicts that risk aversion affects educational choice via the 
marginal utility of schooling. The theoretical framework predicts that selected years of 
schooling decrease when absolute risk aversion increases. The empirical findings, which are 
based on Italian household survey data, support the theoretical priors. This result has received 
further recent empirical support from Guiso and Paiello (2007). Belzil and Leonardi (2007) 
also use Italian survey data to explore whether the transition from different levels of education 
changes with risk aversion and parental education background. Their findings suggest that 
different attitudes towards risk do not determine the level of schooling. 
In a similar vein, Barsky et al. (1997) present measures of preference parameters 
relating to risk tolerance, time preference and inter-temporal substitution based on the U.S. 
Health and Retirement Study. The authors explore how risk preference varies across 
individual characteristics and report a ‘U’ shaped relationship between years of education 
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completed and risk tolerance. Individuals with twelve years of schooling were found to be the 
least risk tolerant, whilst individuals with more than sixteen years of schooling were found to 
have greater than average risk tolerance. In the multivariate regression analysis, however, the 
findings suggest that years of schooling are not associated with risk preference. It should be 
acknowledged that intuitively one might argue that a risk averse individual may have an 
incentive to invest heavily in human capital in order to safe-guard his/her future. Belzil and 
Hansen (2004) find that a counterfactual increase in risk aversion increases educational 
attainment, i.e. human capital accumulation. 
In sum, the relationship between risk preference and educational attainment has 
attracted attention in both the empirical and the theoretical literature on human capital 
accumulation. According to such arguments, educational attainment (i.e. human capital 
accumulation) is influenced by risk preference. Our paper contributes to this area – 
specifically we further explore the relationship between risk preference and human capital 
accumulation from an empirical perspective exploiting a measure a risk preference elicited 
from individuals’ responses to a hypothetical gamble. In addition, we explore the relationship 
between a parent’s risk preference and the academic achievements of their offspring. Given 
the important role that parents play in decisions regarding their children’s education, such an 
intergenerational link, which to our knowledge has not attracted attention in the previous 
empirical literature, may unveil an additional determinant of children’s educational 
attainment. 
II. Data 
The obvious problem with exploring the relationship between human capital and risk 
preference from an empirical perspective lies in locating a suitable measure of risk preference. 
For this purpose, we exploit the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a 
representative panel of individuals ongoing since 1968 conducted at the Institute for Social 
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Research, University of Michigan. The PSID 1996 Survey includes a Risk Aversion Section, 
which contains detailed information on individuals’ attitudes towards risk. The Risk Aversion 
Section contains five questions related to hypothetical gambles with respect to lifetime 
income.   
To be specific, all heads of household were asked the following question (M1): 
Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your current total income. 
And that job was (your/your family’s) only source of income. Then you are given the 
opportunity to take a new, and equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double your 
income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income and 
spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?4  The individuals who answered 
‘yes’ to this question, were then asked (M2): Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the 
new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would you 
still take the job? Those individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this question were then asked 
(M5): Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) 
income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 75%. Would you still take the new job? Individuals 
who answered ‘no’ to Question M1 were asked (M3): Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 
that the new job would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 
percent. Then would you take the job? Those individuals who replied ‘no’ were asked (M4): 
Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family) 
income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 10 percent. Then would you take the new job?  
We use the responses to this series of questions to create a six point risk aversion 
index,  as follows (the percentages of individuals in each category are also shown below): iRA
                                                 
4 As Luoh and Stafford (2005) point out it is important to acknowledge that the question states that the new job 
will be ‘equally as good’ such that there is no difference in the non monetary characteristics of the jobs. Without 
such a qualification, individuals may be less willing to accept the gamble if there are non monetary attachments 
to their current job (Barsky et al., 1997).  
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Thus, the index is increasing in risk aversion such that if an individual rejects all the 
hypothetical gambles offered, the risk aversion index takes the highest value of 5, whilst if the 
individual accepts all gambles offered the risk aversion index takes the value of zero. It is 
interesting to note the low (high) percentage of respondents with the lowest (highest) value of 
the risk aversion index. Intermediate cases lie in between these two extreme values such that 
individuals are ranked according to their reluctance to accept the hypothetical gambles. The 
series of questions, thus, enables us to place individuals into one of six categories of risk 
aversion. Furthermore, as stated by Barsky et al. (1997), who find that this risk tolerance 
measure does predict risky behaviour such as smoking, drinking alcohol, not having 
insurance, choosing risky employment and holding risky financial assets, ‘the categories can 
be ranked by risk aversion without having to assume a particular form for the utility function,’ 
p.540. 
 A further measure of risk preference is available from the PSID 1996 survey based 
on Questions M1 to M5 above. Based on Barsky et al. (1997), a measure of risk tolerance 
( ) is available in the PSID where the answers to Questions M1 to M5 have been converted 
into a single quantitative index of risk tolerance, which has been corrected for measurement 
error.
iRT
5 Thus,  being a measure of risk tolerance is inversely related to risk aversion.iRT
6
                                                 
5 A detailed explanation of the conversion procedure is given by Luoh and Stafford (2005), which is summarized 
here. The risk tolerance data are taken from the last column of Table 1 in Barsky et al. (1997). Assume a utility 
function, , that q is log-normally distributed and ( ) ( )( ) qcqcU /11/11/1 −−= ( )qG ln= . We observe which lies 
in one of the categories determined by the hypothetical gamble questions. The product of each individual’s 
probability of being in a particular category yields the likelihood function. Maximizing the likelihood function 
and computing expected means conditional on being in a particular category yields q (Luoh and Stafford, 2005). 
*G
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III.  Educational and Risk preference 
Our sample is restricted to those heads of household in employment in 1996 aged between 18 
and 65, yielding a total of 5,277 observations.7 We explore the relationship between risk 
preference and human capital accumulation by modeling education, , as a function of risk 
preference: 
ie
( ) 1, iiii rfe ε+= X           (1) 
 
where  denotes the measure of risk preference and  represents a set of additional 
explanatory variables, which draws on Wilson et al. (2005) and includes: age; gender; 
ethnicity; the mothers’ marital status when the respondent was born; whether the respondent 
lived with his/her parents until age 16; whether the parents worked when the respondent was 
growing up; fathers’ occupational status when the respondent was growing up; number of 
siblings; whether the respondent was the first born; whether the mother was born outside of 
the U.S.; the educational attainment of both parents; type of religion and whether the family 
was poor when the respondent was growing up.  
ir iX
 In order to ascertain the robustness of our findings, we analyze both measures of risk 
preference,  and . Similarly, we explore two measures of education – an index 
denoting the highest educational attainment of the head of household ( ) and the number of 
years of completed schooling by the head of household ( ). The highest educational 
attainment variable is a five point index where: 0 denotes less than high school completed, i.e. 
less than grade 12; 1 denotes high school completed; 2 denotes that the individual went to 
college but did not graduate;
iRA iRT
ie
is
8 3 denotes that the individual graduated from college; and, 
finally, 4 denotes that the individual completed some postgraduate education. The number of 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 It should be re-iterated that our measures of risk preference are based on hypothetical rather than actual 
behavior. In Section IV, we explore an alternative measure of risk preference based on actual behavior. 
7 We focus on employees given the nature of the risk aversion question in the PSID, which relates to income 
from employment, i.e. income from employment is explicitly stated as the only income source.  
8 This category includes individuals who went to vocational schools. 
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years of completed schooling is a continuous variable with a minimum (maximum) of 8 (17) 
years of schooling.  We estimate equation (1) as an ordered probit model when measuring 
education by the index denoting the highest educational attainment of the head of household 
( ) given the inherent ordering of the index. When measuring education using the number of 
years of schooling completed by the head of household ( ), equation (1) is estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). 
ie
is
 Table 1 presents a correlation matrix; between  and ; between  and ; and 
between the risk preference and educational attainment measures. The degree of correlation 
between the two measures of risk preference is in accordance with a priori expectations, i.e. 
the measure of risk tolerance is inversely related to the index of risk aversion. Moreover, the 
strong inverse relationship is significant at the one per cent level. Similarly, the correlation 
between  and  is positive and significant at the one per cent level. Finally, the measures of 
education are inversely associated with risk aversion and positively associated with risk 
tolerance. Such relationships between the key variables are in accordance with the empirical 
findings of Brown and Taylor (2005), Brunello (2002), Guiso and Paiella (2007) and Shaw 
(1996). Summary statistics relating to the variables used in our empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 2.  
iRA iRT ie is
ie is
 In Table 3 the results of estimating equation (1) are summarized for both measures of 
education: Panels A and B presents the results for the highest education attainment index ( ) 
whilst Panel C presents the results for years of completed schooling ( ). Due to the ordered 
nature of the highest education attainment index ( ), we present the marginal effects of risk 
preference on the probability of having each level of education from no education, i.e. less 
than high school where index, , equals zero, through to having completed some 
postgraduate study, where , equals four. For each measure of education, we estimate two 
ie
is
ie
ie
ie
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specifications: specification 1 includes  in the set of explanatory variables whilst 
specification 2 includes  in the set of explanatory variables. The set of explanatory 
variables in each of these models is as shown in Table 4, which gives the full estimation 
results of the educational attainment equations where risk preference is measured by .
iRA
iRT
iRA
9  
 It is apparent that, for our sample of 5,277 individuals, there is a statistically 
significant association between risk preference and both measures of education. The marginal 
effects show that risk preference, as measured by the risk aversion index ( ), is associated 
with an increase in the probability of having less than high school education (Table 3 Panel 
A). Indeed, a one standard deviation increase in the risk aversion index is associated with an 
increase in the probability of having less than high school education by 1.9%.
iRA
10 Similarly, at 
the opposite end of the educational attainment hierarchy, a one standard deviation increase in 
risk aversion is associated with a decrease in the probability of having completed 
postgraduate study by 1%. Consistent results are found with the alternative measure of 
educational attainment, shown in Table 3 Panel C, where increasing risk aversion is inversely 
associated with the number of years of completed schooling ( ). A one point move up the 
risk aversion index is associated with a decrease in the number of years of completed 
schooling by around 1.9%.
is
11 We also consider the effect of risk tolerance ( ) upon both 
measures of education. As expected, risk tolerance is inversely associated with the probability 
of having less than high school education (Table 3 Panel B) and correspondingly positively 
related to the number of years of schooling (Table 3 Panel C). For example, a one standard 
iRT
                                                 
9 In accordance with the existing literature we find that educational attainment is increasing in: age; father’s 
occupation; mother’s and father’s educational attainment; religion; whether the individual is male and whether 
the individual was the firstborn. Factors which significantly decrease educational attainment are ethnicity and the 
number of siblings.  
10 These calculations are based on the mean sample characteristics of individuals. For example, the 1.9% effect is 
calculated by multiplying the marginal effect, 0.0118, by the standard deviation of the risk aversion index, 
1.6314. 
11 This is calculated as a risk preference elasticity such that ( ) ( )s r r s∂ ∂ × , where (ˆ )s rφ = ∂ ∂  and r  and s  
denote the mean values of r and s respectively. 
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deviation increase in risk tolerance is associated with a decrease in the probability of having 
education less than high school by 1.6% and an increase in the probability of having 
completed some postgraduate study by 0.9%. Noticeably, risk preference generally has a 
monotonic relationship with educational attainment. In general, our findings accord with 
those of Brunello (2002) and Guiso and Paiella (2007) in that risk aversion is found to be 
inversely associated with educational attainment.12
IV.  Risk Preference and Time Invariance 
A potential problem with our measures of risk preference is that, as argued by Brunello 
(2002), educational choice depends upon risk attitudes at the time of the choice rather than 
risk preference observed in 1996. Hence, exploring the relationship between the 1996 risk 
preference measures and educational attainment may be problematic as human capital 
investments may have been made some time ago, for instance, when the individual was at 
high school. The inclusion of the 1996 risk preference measures in the educational attainment 
equation may be appropriate if risk preferences do not vary over time or if the human capital 
investments were made in 1996. The extent of the time variance issue may depend on the gap 
between the age of the individual in 1996 and the age of the individual when the human 
capital investment was undertaken. This potential problem was pointed out by Brunello 
(2002), but was not explicitly addressed in his empirical analysis of Italian survey data. Thus, 
the measures of risk preference are only meaningful if risk preferences are time invariant or if 
the influence of the time variant component of risk preference is small in terms of magnitude. 
In order to explore such issues, researchers have analyzed the relationship between age and 
proxies for risk preference such as the propensity to hold risky financial assets. Based upon 
                                                 
12 A related line of enquiry relates to whether risk preference influences the returns to human capital investment. 
If risk preferences influence educational attainment, which in turn influences earnings, it may be the case that 
omitting risk preference in an educational attainment model may bias any estimates of the returns to education. 
Following Brunello (2002), we have explored the validity of risk preference as an over-identifying instrument 
for education in an earnings function. In accordance with Brunello (2002), we find that risk preference is a valid 
instrument for education in a wage equation. 
 11
U.S. data, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), for example, found the impact of an individual’s age 
on the decision to hold risky stocks to be statistically insignificant. More recently, Guiso et al. 
(2003) have also found the share of assets held in risky stocks to be invariant with respect to 
age effects in a number of countries. Such findings suggest that risk preferences do not vary 
with age. 
 We explore this issue in three ways. Firstly, we analyse the significance and 
magnitude of age effects in the risk preference equation. Secondly, we estimate the 
educational attainment equations by age cohorts in order to ascertain the robustness of the 
influence of risk preference on education across time. Clearly, for the youngest cohort, the 
potential gap between 1996 and the age of the human capital accumulation, will, on average, 
be the smallest. Thirdly, we exploit information relating to risk preferences from previous 
waves of the PSID. 
 We firstly model our measures of risk preference ( ) conditional upon: age; age 
squared; ethnicity; gender; marital status; household size, number of children in the 
household; and whether the individual’s home is owned outright (i.e. without a mortgage). 
We also control for household wealth, household labor income, household benefit income and 
the log expected value of the gamble,
ir
13 as these may influence risk preference, especially if 
individuals misinterpret ‘income’ in the above questions M1 to M5 to include wealth. We also 
include an early measure of risk preference based on actual behaviour, which is defined in 
detail below. These variables are all contained in the vector Z and measured at 1996. Thus, we 
estimate the following equation as an ordered probit regression: 
( ) 2ln, iiii ygr ε+= Z           (2) 
 
                                                 
13 To be specific:  if 0RA = , ( ) ( )= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.25ev LY LY ; if 1RA = , ; if 
, ; if 
( ) (= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.5ev LY LY )
)2RA = ( ) (= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.66ev LY LY 3RA = , ( ) ( )= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.8ev LY LY ; if 4RA = , 
; finally, if ( ) (= 0.5 2 + 0.5 0.9ev LY LY ) 5RA = , LYev = . 
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In order to explore the robustness of our findings, we then re-estimate our educational 
attainment equations replacing  with a value purged from identifiable influences, defined as: ir
2iˆε , the residual from the ordered probit model, i.e. equation (2), where the risk attitudes 
index is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables represent a combination of 
individual and household characteristics. 
 The results from estimating the two risk preference equations (i.e. risk avoidance and 
risk tolerance) are presented in Tables 5A and 5B. It is apparent from the estimated risk 
preference equations, i.e. equation (2), that  and   are both influenced by age which 
suggests that risk preferences are not time invariant. However, the marginal effects of the 
quadratic in age (see Table 5B) are relatively small for both measures of risk preference at the 
extreme values of the two measures and are only statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level for  and insignificant for .  
iRA iRT
iRT iRA
 We replicate our analysis of Table 3 by estimating equation (1) based upon 2iˆε , the 
residual from equation (2), for both measures of education. Table 6 Panels A and B present 
the results for the highest education attainment index ( ) whilst Panel C presents the results 
for years of completed schooling ( ).
ie
is
14 The results summarized in Table 6 concur with those 
of Table 3, where risk preference is treated exogenously, in that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between both measures of risk preference and education. For example, 
a one standard deviation increase in 2iˆε  is associated with an increase in the probability of 
having less than high school education by 1%. Similarly, at the opposite end of the 
educational attainment hierarchy, a one standard deviation increase in 2iˆε  is associated with a 
decrease in the probability of having completed postgraduate study by 0.52%. Hence, our 
                                                 
14 Our use of a generated variable may potentially induce bias in the estimates. As such, the standard errors on 
2ˆiε  in equation (1) have been bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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findings suggest that the correlation between risk preference and education reported in Table 
3 is not capturing, for example, an unobserved wealth or age effect. 
 To further explore this issue, we estimate educational attainment equations by age 
cohorts, i.e. by individuals born in the following decades: 1930s; 1940s; 1950s; 1960s and 
1970s. We test whether the influence of risk preference on educational attainment in each 
cohort (i.e. sub-sample) is significantly different from the estimated coefficient on risk 
preference in the education equation estimated over the entire sample. The results presented in 
Table 7 reveal that the null hypothesis that the influence of risk preference on education is the 
same as the 1996 effect of risk preference on education cannot, in general, be rejected across 
successive cohorts.15 The findings that the estimated coefficients on the risk preference 
measures do not vary across the age cohorts provide further support for the time invariance of 
the influence of risk preference on educational attainment.  
 Finally, over the period 1969 to 1972, an index of risk avoidance is available in four 
waves of the PSID, which is the early risk preference measure included in equation (2) above. 
This measure of risk avoidance is derived from questions relating to factors such as the head 
of household’s seat belt usage, smoking behavior and purchases of medical insurance and car 
insurance, i.e. actual rather than hypothetical behavior. It is possible that individuals are in the 
sample between 1 to 4 times during the period 1969 to 1972. Hence, we take an average of the 
risk avoidance index over a maximum of four years as our early measure of risk preference, 
. There are 647 individuals who were heads of households in both 1996 and over the 
period 1969 to 1972. These individuals are aged between 41 and 65. Hence, for these 
individuals we can compare the relationship between the risk preference measure reported in 
1996 and educational attainment with that of the risk preference measure reported over 1969 
o
iRA
                                                 
15 Tests that the estimated coefficients on the risk preference variable between successive cohorts, 1930=1940; 
1940=1950 etc., are equal cannot be rejected. 
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to 1972.16 Indeed, if risk preference is largely time invariant then we would expect the 
relationship between  and education to have the same sign and to be similar in magnitude 
to that between   and education. It should be explicitly acknowledged that  and  
do differ in terms of the underlying survey questions being based on hypothetical behavior in 
the case of RA nd on actual behavior in the case of oiRA . Despite such differences, however, 
for this sub-sample of individuals, the correlation between the risk aversion index of 1996 and 
risk avoidance index of the earlier period is 0.0797, which is statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level. Thus, the two risk preference variables, although constructed from survey 
responses given two decades apart, are positively related suggesting time invariance of risk 
preferences.  
o
iRA
iRA iRA
o
iRA
i  a
                                                
 To further investigate the relationship between risk preference and human capital, we 
estimate equation (1) based on the sub-sample of 647 individuals who were present in both 
the 1996 PSID and at least one year in the 1969 to 1972 PSID. The results are shown in Table 
8 for both measures of education: Panels A and B present the results for the highest education 
attainment index ( ) for each risk measure, and Panel C presents the results for years of 
completed schooling ( ). In Panels A and B, the marginal effects are reported across each of 
the education categories, along with the percentage impact of a one standard deviation 
increase in risk preference. For this sub-sample of individuals, risk preference measured at 
1996 and risk preference measured over 1969 to 1972 are both statistically significantly 
related to each category of educational attainment and the number of years of completed 
schooling. Noticeably, the association between risk preference and educational attainment is 
more pronounced for the earlier period relative to 1996: 6.49% versus 1.9% for the 
probability of having less than high school education ( ); 7.19% versus 1% for the 
ie
is
0=ie
 
16 The risk avoidance index is increasing in risk aversion and so a priori we would expect it to be positively 
correlated with the 1996 measure of risk aversion. 
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probability of having completed some postgraduate education ( ); and 17.08% versus 
1.95% for years of completed schooling. Such findings are not surprising as one might predict 
that the majority of educational attainment would have been achieved closer to the early time 
period and, hence, the relationship between  and human capital accumulation is 
predictably stronger than that between risk preference measured in 1996 and educational 
attainment.
4=ie
o
iRA
17  
V.  Parental Risk Preference and Children’s Academic Achievement 
Given that parents play an important role in decisions regarding their children’s education, it 
is apparent that a parent’s risk preference may influence their off-spring’s education, 
potentially to a greater extent than the risk preference of the child. To be specific, an 
individual’s educational attainment may reflect the decisions made on his/her behalf by 
parents and, hence, may reflect the risk preference of the parents. In order to explore this 
hitherto neglected area of research, we exploit the data from the PSID Child Development 
Supplement (CDS) 1997. The 1997 CDS provides additional information relating to parents in 
the PSID and their children with the objective being to provide information on early human 
capital formation.18 All PSID families with children aged between 0 and 12 were invited to 
complete the CDS, where up to two children per family were included in the survey. In cases 
where there were more than two eligible children in the family, two were randomly selected 
to take part in the study. Our sample of children from the 1997 CDS comprises approximately 
1,000 children. We match the sample of children to the 1996 PSID, which provides detailed 
information on their parents, in particular, the risk preference of their parents.  
                                                 
17 We also explore this by including the two risk preference measures, the 1996 measure and the 1969 to 1972 
measure, in the educational attainment equation simultaneously. The equality of the coefficients is always 
rejected at the 1 per cent level across both measures of education, with the early measure having the dominant 
effect. 
18 A number of papers have exploited the detailed information in the PSID CDS. For example, Weinberg (2001) 
has explored an incentive model of the effect of parental income on children reporting a positive relationship 
between parental income and child outcomes. Case et al. (2002), using the PSID CDS, show that the relationship 
between income and health status for adults has antecedents in childhood. 
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 We focus on the relationship between the parent’s risk preference and their children’s 
age-standardized scores in the Woodcock-Johnson Revised Achievement Tests, which are 
widely used and have been validated extensively (see Woodcock and Johnson, 1990, for 
further details of the tests). As part of the 1997 CDS, children aged 3 to 12 took the 
Woodcock-Johnson Achievement Test, covering: Reading Tests and Mathematics Test. The 
Reading Test is a combination of a Letter Word Identification Test and a Passage 
Comprehension Test; similarly, the Mathematics Test is a combination of an Applied 
Problems Test and a Calculation Skills Tests. Children younger that 6 years old did not 
complete all the tests, therefore we focus our study on the Standardized Applied Problem 
Test, with a sample of 1,038 children (mean age 7 years old)  and the Standardized Reading 
Test with a sample of 722 children (mean age 9 years old). 
 We explore the relationship between parental risk preference and their child’s 
achievements in the Standardized Reading Test and the Standardized Applied Problem Test 
by modeling the child’s (j) 1997 test score, jTEST , as a function of the risk preference of the 
parent who is the head of household in 1996 (i)  employing OLS, as follows: 
( )1997 1996,j j i jTEST h r ε= K +         (3) 
where  denotes the measure of parental risk aversion elicited from the PSID 1996, and  
represents a set of additional explanatory variables (derived from the 1997 and 2002 CDS), 
which includes information related to the child such as: age; weight; gender; ethnicity; 
whether the child is living with his/her parents; and the number of children in the household. 
In this set of explanatory variables, we also include variables, which are related to the parent 
including: marital status; religion; years of education; household labor income, household 
wealth, and household income from benefits. The results presented in Table 9, Panel A, 
suggest that scores in the Reading and Applied Problem Tests are inversely associated with 
ir jK
 17
the parent’s risk preference index ( ), where a one standard deviation increase in  is 
associated with a around a 6% (9%) lower reading (applied problem) test score. In Panel B, 
we replace the risk aversion index with the risk tolerance index. The results suggest that risk 
tolerance is positively associated with the test scores. The estimated relationship between the 
risk aversion/risk tolerance index and the test scores does not change when we replace the 
index with its residual (
ir iRA
2iˆε ), constructed as described above, as shown in Panels C and D.  
 Finally, we split the sample according to whether the head of the household is the 
father or the mother of the child, as potentially this might influence the relationship between 
parental risk preference and the child’s test score. Interestingly, the results presented in Table 
10, Panels A and B, suggest that the risk preference of the father has no effect on the child’s 
test scores. However, where the mother is the head of the household, Panels C and D, the 
inverse relationship between the risk aversion of the parent and the test scores of their 
offspring is statistically significant.  
VI.  Conclusions 
This paper has focused on the relationship between risk preference and educational attainment 
using individual level U.S. data drawn from the PSID. Our empirical findings support a 
statistically significant relationship between risk preference and educational attainment. This 
result is robust across different measures of education and different measures of risk 
preference. Specifically, greater levels of risk aversion are inversely associated with 
educational attainment. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical literature and the 
limited amount of empirical evidence in this area, such as, Barsky et al. (1997), and Guiso 
and Paiella (2007). In addition, we explore the relationship between the risk preference of 
parents and the educational achievements of their children using the 1997 PSID CDS. Despite 
the important role of the parental decision-making in their off-spring’s education, this 
relationship has not been previously studied in the empirical literature. Our findings support 
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an inverse relationship between parental risk aversion and the educational achievements of 
their children. 
Given both the potential time and financial dimensions to the investments made by 
parents in their children’s education, our findings are particularly interesting from a policy-
maker’s perspective. For example, our findings add to the current debate on the funding and 
access to higher education especially in the context of the reforms to the funding for higher 
education in the U.K., which have been designed to alter the social mix of students to 
encourage participation amongst lower socio economics groups, Greenaway and Haynes 
(2000). If risk-aversion is concentrated amongst the lower socio-economic groups, then our 
framework predicts that such individuals may be unlikely to invest in their own human capital 
or the human capital of their children given the current funding system. 
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iRA  iRT  ie  is  
iRA  1.0000  
iRT  -0.9533  p=[0.000] 1.0000  
ie  -0.0554  p=[0.003] 0.0482  p=[0.001] 1.000  
is  -0.1062  p=[0.000]   0.0838  p=[0.000] 0.6326  p=[0.000] 1.000
Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Risk Preference and Educational Attainment 
 
   Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 MEAN STD. DEV MAX MIN
Head of household characteristics in 1996:     
Highest educational attainment index  ie 2.6192 1.1978 5 1 
Number of years of completed schooling is 12.7998 3.1909 17 0 
Risk aversion index  iRA 3.1760 1.6314 5 0 
Risk tolerance  iRT 1.0640 1.2014 3                       0 
Age 39.3087 10.8307 65 18 
Male 0.7218 0.4481 1 0 
White 0.3945 0.4887 1 0 
Black 0.2209 0.4149 1                       0 
Latin 0.0077 0.0878 1 0 
Catholic 0.1356 0.3424 1 0 
Jewish 0.1762 0.1315 1 0 
Protestant 0.4508 0.4976 1 0 
Log household wealth 2.11872 3.3328 14.5086 0 
Log household labor income 9.5288 2.4886 13.5923 0 
Log household income from benefits 0.98171 2.5546 13.8155 0 
Log expected value of the gamble 13.5725 2.3914 17.5314 0 
Own home 035798 0.4936 1 0 
Number of children in the household 0.9840 1.1515 8 0 
Household size 2.7951 1.4243 10 1 
Single 0.2014 0.4011 1                       0 
Separated/divorced 0.2122 0.4089 1                     0 
Widowed 0.2899 0.1678 1            0 
Head of household’s childhood:     
Mother single when child born 0.4813 0.2140 1 0 
Mother widow when child born 0.0036 0.0599 1 0 
Mother separated/divorced when child born 0.1478 0.1206 1 0 
Lived with parents until 16 0.6236 0.4845 1 0 
Mother worked when child growing up 0.3213 0.4670 1 0 
Father worker when child growing up 0.9990 0.0307 1 0 
Father professional or managerial 0.0860 0.2804 1 0 
Father self employed 0.4737 0.2124 1 0 
Father clerical or crafts 0.2078 0.4058 1 0 
Father manual 2.1320 3.6895 1 0 
Number of siblings 2.1315 2.4935 10 0 
Firstborn 0.1589 0.3657 1 0 
Mother born outside US 0.2931 0.4552 1 0 
Mother high school education 0.3359 0.4723 1 0 
Mother college education 0.1303 03367 1                       0 
Father high school education 0.2141 0.4102 1 0 
Father college education 0.1627 0.3692 1 0 
Family was poor when growing up 0.3215 0.4671 1 0 
OBSERVATIONS 5,277       
PANEL A: HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINMENT INDEX ( ) AND RISK AVERSION INDEX ie
 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL COMPLETED 
( ) 0=ie
HIGH SCHOOL 
COMPLETED ( ) 1=ie
 WENT TO COLLEGE 
DID NOT GRADUATE 
( ) 2=ie
GRADUATED FROM 
COLLEGE ( 3= ) ie
SOME 
POSTGRADUATE 
STUDY ( ) 4=ie
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk Aversion Index  iRA 0.0118 (5.22) 0.0073 (5.13) -0.0052 (5.13) -0.0076 (5.16) -0.0062 (5.16) 
Chi Squared (28) 934.55 p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0582 
PANEL B: HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINTMENT ( ) AND RISK TOLERANCE ie
 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL COMPLETED 
( ) 0=ie
HIGH SCHOOL 
COMPLETED ( ) 1=ie
 WENT TO COLLEGE 
DID NOT GRADUATE 
( ) 2=ie
GRADUATED FROM 
COLLEGE ( 3= ) ie
SOME 
POSTGRADUATE 
STUDY ( )  4=ie
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk Tolerance  iRT -0.0134 (4.39) -0.0082 (4.33) 0.0595 (4.31) 0.0086 (4.35) 0.0071 (4.35) 
Chi Squared (28) 926.47 p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0577 
PANEL C: YEARS OF COMPLETED SCHOOLING INDEX AND RISK AVERSION ( ) is
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Risk Aversion Index  iRA -0.0748 (2.86)   
Risk Tolerance  iRT
  0.0860 (2.44) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.1079 0.1027 
OBSERVATIONS 5,277 
Notes: (i) Control variables are as shown in Table 4; (ii) M.E. denotes marginal effect; (iii) The results shown in Panels A and B are estimated from an ordered probit model, whilst those in 
Panel C are from OLS estimation. 
Table 3: Risk Preference and Educational Attainment  
  
Table 4: The Determinants of Educational Attainment 
 
HIGHEST EDUCATION 
ATTAINMENT INDEX ie
YEARS OF COMPLETED 
SCHOOLING INDEX is
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Head of household characteristics in 1996:    
Age 0.7088 (8.52) 0.1784 (7.66)
Age squared -0.0007 (7.68) -0.0019 (7.08)
Male 0.0912 (2.50) 0.5339       (5.15)
White -0.0494 (0.93) 0.0552 (0.36)
Black -0.1791 (2.86) -0.3123 (1.75)
Latin -0.4661 (2.58) -1.1241 (2.24)
Catholic 0.2462 (4.07) 0.5530 (3.20)
Jewish 0.6842 (5.57) 1.2475 (3.60)
Protestant 0.0645 (1.29) 0.1860 (1.31)
Risk Aversion Index -0.0479 (5.23) -0.0748    (2.86)
Head of household’s childhood:    
Mother single when child born -0.0859 (1.16) -0.0799 (0.38)
Mother widow when child born 0.0389 (0.16) 0.1106 (0.16)
Mother separated/divorced when child born -0.0150 (0.12) 0.0264 (0.08)
Lived with parents until 16 0.0864 (2.71) 0.3409 (3.74)
Mother worked when child growing up 0.0348 (1.07) 0.0908 (0.97)
Father worked when child growing up -0.4479 (0.92) -0.7731 (0.57)
Father professional or managerial 0.3798 (6.64) 0.8194 (5.00)
Father self employed 0.3160 (4.45) 0.6861 (3.37)
Father clerical or crafts 0.0156 (0.41) 0.0425 (0.39)
Father manual -0.0596 (1.45) -0.1162 (0.99)
Number of siblings -0.0590 (9.05) -0.1207 (6.58)
Firstborn 0.1273 (2.92) 0.3080 (2.46)
Mother born outside US 0.6702 (1.88) 0.2327 (2.29)
Mother high school education 0.1383 (3.86) 0.2900  (2.83)
Mother college education 0.3523 (6.76) 0.8335 (5.58)
Father high school education 0.1232 (3.08) 0.2672 (2.33)
Father college education 0.3243 (6.55) 0.5755  (4.05)
Family was poor when growing up -0.0618 (1.60) -0.1013   (1.92)
Chi Squared (28 ) 934.55 – 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0582 – 
Adjusted R Squared – 0.1031 
OBSERVATIONS   5,277 
Notes: is estimated as an ordered probit model and ie is is estimated by OLS. 
Table 5A: The Determinants of Risk Preference 
 RISK AVERSION  iRA RISK TOLERANCE iRT
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Age -0.0152 (1.47) 0.0193         (1.71)
Age squared 0.0003 (2.75) -0.0004 (2.93)
Male -0.2289 (5.05) 0.2423 (4.98)
White -0.0815 (1.80) 0.0577    (1.19)
Black 0.0491 (0.93) -0.0529   (0.93)
Latin -0.1850 (1.09) 0.1079   (0.59)
Single -0.1655 (2.95) 0.1939 (3.22)
Separated/divorced -0.0794 (1.47) 0.1009 (1.74)
Widow 0.0394 (0.37) 0.0456 (0.39)
Number of children in the household -0.0200 (0.64) -0.0185 (0.55)
Household size 0.2477 (0.90) 0.0042 (0.14)
Own home 0.0981 (2.71) -0.1080 (2.77)
Early risk preference measure 0.0636 (4.54) -0.0697 (4.60)
No information about early risk preference 0.0076 (0.17) -0.0171 (0.36)
Log household wealth -0.0119 (2.51) 0.0100 (1.97)
Log household labor income 0.0171 (2.73) -0.0213 (3.18)
Log household income from benefits -0.0143 (2.39) 0.0155 (2.42)
Log expected value of hypothetical gamble -0.0154 (1.54) 0.0067 (0.62)
Chi Squared (18) 281.07 p=[0.000] 237.41 p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0157 0.0180 
OBSERVATIONS 5,277   
 
Table 5B: The Determinants of Risk Preference – Marginal Effects of Age 
PANEL A: Risk Aversion Index  iRA LOWEST ( )0=iRA  HIGHEST ( )5=iRA  
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Age 0.0018 (1.47) -0.0053 (1.47)
Age Squared -0.0001 (2.74) 0.0001 (2.75)
PANEL B: Risk Tolerance  iRT LOWEST
 ( )15.0=iRT  HIGHEST ( )57.0=iRT  
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Age -0.0077 (1.71) 0.0053        (1.71)
Age Squared 0.0001 (2.93) -0.0001 (2.93)
Notes: (i) Control variables in Table 5B are as in Table 5A; (ii) M.E. denotes marginal effect. 
 
PANEL A: HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINMENT INDEX ( ) AND RISK AVERSION ie
 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL 
COMPLETED 
( 0= ) ie
HIGH SCHOOL 
COMPLETED 
( 1= ) ie
 WENT TO 
COLLEGE DID NOT 
GRADUATE ( 2= )ie
GRADUATED FROM 
COLLEGE ( ) 3=ie
SOME 
POSTGRADUATE 
STUDY ( 4= ) ie
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk Aversion Index – Residual 2iˆε  0.0098 (4.32) 0.0060 (4.26) -0.0043 (4.24) -0.0063 (4.28) -0.0052 (4.29) 
Chi Squared (28) 925.86  p=[0.000]  
Pseudo R Squared 0.0577 
PANEL B: HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINMENT INDEX ( ) AND RISK TOLERANCE ie
 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL 
COMPLETED 
( ) 0=ie
HIGH SCHOOL 
COMPLETED 
( ) 1=ie
 WENT TO 
COLLEGE DID NOT 
GRADUATE ( )2=ie
GRADUATED FROM 
COLLEGE ( ) 3=ie
SOME 
POSTGRADUATE 
STUDY ( ) 4=ie
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk Tolerance – Residual 2iˆε  0.0540 (2.95) 0.0331 (2.93) -0.0238 (2.93) -0.0346 (2.94) -0.0286 (2.94) 
Chi Squared (28) 915.87  p=[0.000]  
Pseudo R Squared 0.0571 
PANEL C: YEARS OF COMPLETED SCHOOLING INDEX ( ) is
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Risk Aversion Index – Residual 2iˆε      -0.0584 (2.23) 
Risk Tolerance – Residual 2iˆε  -0.5423 (2.57) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.1026 0.1028 
OBSERVATIONS 5,277 
Notes: (i) Control variables are as shown in Table 4; (ii) M.E. denotes marginal effect; (iii) The results shown in Panels A and B are estimated from an ordered probit model, those in Panel C 
are from OLS estimation.
Table 6: Risk Preference Residual ( 2iˆε ) and Educational Attainment 
Table 7: The Relationship between Risk Preference and Education Attainment across Age Cohorts 
  DECADE OF BIRTH 
  
COEFFICIENT  NULL HYPOTHESIS 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Dependent Variable =  , Risk Preference =  ie iRA
 
 
= 1996 effect 
 
-0.0445 
-0.1434 
p=[0.0651] 
-0.0958 
p=[0.0592] 
-0.0248 
p=[0.2703] 
-0.0166 
p=[0.1295] 
-0.0687 
p=0.3807] 
Dependent Variable =  , Risk Preference =  ie iRT
 
 
= 1996 effect 
 
0.3894 
1.7016 
p=[0.0284] 
0.8813 
p=[0.0792] 
0.1790 
p=[0.2420] 
0.1021 
p=[0.1201] 
0.7039 
p=0.2364] 
Dependent Variable = , Risk Preference =  is iRA
 
 
= 1996 effect 
 
-0.1285 
-0.3436 
p=[0.1113] 
-0.3120 
p=0.0750] 
-0.1121 
p=[0.6648] 
-0.1123 
p=[0.8585] 
-0.1328 
p=[0.9324] 
Dependent Variable = , Risk Preference =  is iRT
 
 
= 1996 effect 
 
1.0096 
3.5549 
p=[0.1145] 
2.7086 
p=[0.0104] 
0.7412 
p=[0.4847] 
0.9730 
p=[0.9172] 
1.2108 
p=[0.6829] 
        
OBSERVATIONS   
(% SAMPLE) 
  247   
(4.69%) 
861 
(16.32%) 
1,772 
(33.58%) 
1,642 
(31.11%) 
755 
(14.30%) 
Notes: (i) Controls are as in Table 4; (ii) is estimated as an ordered probit model and ie is is estimated by OLS. 
PANEL A: HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINMENT INDEX ( ) AND RISK AVERSION (1996) ie
 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL COMPLETED 
( 0 ) =ie
HIGH SCHOOL 
COMPLETED ( ) 1=ie
 WENT TO COLLEGE 
DID NOT GRADUATE 
( 2 ) =ie
GRADUATED FROM 
COLLEGE ( 3= ) ie
SOME 
POSTGRADUATE 
STUDY ( 4 ) =ie
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk Aversion Index  iRA 0.01949 (3.46) 0.01409 (3.33) 0.00691 (2.92) -0.01881 (3.35) -0.02167 (3.48) 
Effect (%) 2.95% 2.13% 1.04% -2.84% -3.28% 
Chi Squared (35) 120.62  p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0601 
PANEL B: HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINMENT INDEX ( ) AND RISK AVOIDANCE INDEX (1969-72) ie
 
LESS THAN HIGH 
SCHOOL COMPLETED 
( ) 0=ie
HIGH SCHOOL 
COMPLETED ( ) 1=ie
 WENT TO COLLEGE 
DID NOT GRADUATE 
( ) 2=ie
GRADUATED FROM 
COLLEGE ( 3= ) ie
SOME 
POSTGRADUATE 
STUDY ( ) 4=ie
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Risk Avoidance Index  oiRA 0.04662 (6.75) 0.03638 (6.14) 0.01888 (4.41) -0.05021 (6.21) -0.05167 (6.95) 
Effect (%) 6.49% 5.06% 2.63% -6.99% -7.19% 
Chi Squared (35) 166.40  p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0827 
PANEL C: YEARS OF COMPLETED SCHOOLING INDEX ( ) is
 COEF TSTAT Effect (%) COEF TSTAT Effect (%)
Risk Aversion Index  iRA -0.25661 (4.04) 6.95%    
Risk Avoidance Index  oiRA     -0.72379 (10.67) 17.08% 
OBSERVATIONS  647
Notes: (i) Control variables are as shown in Table 4; (ii) M.E. denotes marginal effect relating to the probability of having no education, i.e. less than high school; (iii) The results shown in Panels A and B are 
estimated from an ordered probit model, those in Panel C are from OLS estimation; (iv) in Panels A and B the “Effect (%)” figures are derived by multiplying the marginal effect by the standard deviation of the 
relevant risk preference measure; (v) in Panel C the figures in the column labeled ‘Effect (%)’ are derived from ( ) ( )
Table 8: The Timing of the Measurement of Risk Preference and Educational Attainment  
s r r∂ ∂ × s , i.e. risk preference elasticity, where ( )ˆ s rφ = ∂ ∂  and r  and s  denote the mean 
values of r and s respectively. 
Table 9: Children’s Academic Test Scores and Parent’s Risk Aversion 
PANEL A: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND PARENT’S RISK AVERSION 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Age 0.2693 (4.30) 0.4288 (2.43)  
Age squared -0.0150 (3.64) -0.0225                 (2.30)
Weight 0.0079 (3.10) 0.0045 (1.47)
Male -0.0716 (1.19) 0.0295   (0.40)
White 0.2838 (3.48) 0.2437 (2.39)
Living with parents -0.0852 (0.69) 0.1015  (0.60)
Number of children in the household -0.0236 (0.74) -0.0014 (0.04)
Parent: Single  -0.2293 (1.55) 0.1046 (0.55)
Parent: Separated/divorced 0.0991 (0.68) 0.3441 (1.77)
Parent: Widow 0.0252 (0.08) 0.0760 (0.19)
Parent: Catholic 0.1246 (2.38) 0.2259 (3.45)
Parent: Jewish -0.0609 (0.28) -0.0562 (0.22)
Parent: Protestant -0.0271 (0.41) 0.0064 (0.08)
Years of education of the head of household -0.0311 (2.71) -0.0020 (0.14)
Log household labor income -0.0144 (1.12) -0.0094 (0.60)
Log household wealth 0.0043 (0.46) 0.0040 (0.35)
Log household income from benefits -0.0200 (1.65) -0.0124 (1.76)
Parent’s risk aversion index  iRA -0.0322 (1.87) -0.0485 (2.00)
Adjusted R Squared 0.0715 0.0354 
PANEL B: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND PARENT’S RISK TOLERANCE 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Parent’s risk tolerance index  iRT 0.0521 (1.99) 0.0600 (1.88)
Adjusted R Squared 0.0727 0.0347 
PANEL C: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND PARENT’S RISK AVERSION-RESIDUAL 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Parent’s risk aversion index – Residual 2iˆε  -0.0330               (1.96) -0.0486 (2.00)
Adjusted R Squared 0.0716 0.0353 
PANEL D: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND PARENT’S RISK TOLERANCE -RESIDUAL 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Parent’s risk aversion tolerance – Residual 2iˆε  0.0258        (1.92) 0.0255                   (1.81)
Adjusted R Squared  0.0716 0.0322 
OBSERVATIONS   1,038 722 
Notes: Panels B-D contain the same control variables as given in Panel A. 
  
PANEL A: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND FATHER’S RISK AVERSION 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Father’s risk aversion index  -0.0108 iRA (0.38) -0.0347 (1.03) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.0719 0.0467 
PANEL B: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND FATHER’S RISK TOLERANCE 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Father’s risk tolerance index  0.0234 iRT (0.64) 0.0401 (0.91)
Adjusted R Squared 0.0723 0.0461 
OBSERVATIONS 527 378 
PANEL C: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND MOTHER’S RISK AVERSION 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Mother’s risk aversion index  -0.0623 iRA      (2.22) -0.0648              (1.82)
Adjusted R Squared 0.0784 0.0053 
PANEL D: DETERMINANTS OF TEST SCORES AND MOTHER’S RISK TOLERANCE 
 APPLIED PROBLEMS READING 
 COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Mother’s risk tolerance index  0.0942 iRT     (2.51) 0.0836            (1.76)
Adjusted R Squared  0.0809 0.0046 
OBSERVATIONS 511 344 
Notes: Panels A-D contain the same control variables as given in Table 9 Panel A. 
Table 10: Children’s Academic Test Scores and Parent’s Risk Aversion 
